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Walker Raises Old Questions

This week, Edwin A. Walker, major general, US Army retired, charged before a Senate committee that Secretary of State Dean Rusk is linked with a mysterious apparatus dedicated to a no-win, soft policy toward Communism, a policy which constantly retreats from victory when confronting the Communist world conspiracy. Named also as part of the apparatus was Walt Rostow, identified as having been in control of operations of the CIA since 1954. Rostow is a presidential advisor.

It was this alleged hidden apparatus in the State Department, according to General Walker's convictions, that instigated his removal from command in Germany where he was charged with taking a hand in domestic politics. He claims he was simply innoculating his troops against Communism.

General Walker's charges before the Senate committee will be judged by newspaper readers on their merits, so far as appraising the reasons for his retirement from military service are concerned. There are many who will be unwilling to accept the general's appraisal of Secretary of State Dean Rusk as part of any apparatus dedicated to a sellout of the future of this country to Communism.

There has been revealed in the recent history of this country, however, a certain amount of evidence in support of General Walker's charge that there is a clique in the State Department, and has been over the years, that is soft on Communism.

Many Americans, for example, were never in sympathy with the no-victory rule which was laid down in the Korean War where this country suffered tremendous casualties. They could not understand why the Yalu River marked the boundary. American military efforts clothed in the garments of the United

Nations debating society could not go. They could not understand why there existed in the Korean theater of war a stalemate lasting over a period of years in which our commanders were under instructions "not to win." This was the first war in our history prosecuted on such a basis.

Going back further into the history of the State Department during the past decades, secret papers, the private reports of US diplomats in China during 1943 and subsequent years, make it clear that a soft policy toward Communism did, in those years, exist. The State Department itself printed this report under the title: "Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplo-

matic Papers 1943—China". These reports include those of John Davies who was strong in his praise of the Red Chinese. He was fired 11 years later. Also included are reports sent back to this country by John Carter Vincent, who was forced out of the State Department after an investigation of his role in placing this country on the side of the Chinese Reds and against Chiang Kai-shek. A third name the public will recall is that of John Robert Service who was dismissed by the then Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1951 because of a "reasonable doubt" about his loyalty. The Supreme Court later ruled that the loyalty board acting on his case lacked jurisdiction and Service is now consul at Liverpool.

The tenor of reports from all these men was that the Chinese followers of Mao were not really Communists at all but, in the phrase used in that era almost two decades ago, were agrarian reformers.

It was largely on the basis of the viewpoint of these men that the late Gen. George Catlett Marshall was sent to China by President Truman. He devised, while there, the plan for a forced coalition between the government of Chiang and the Red government of Mao, with the result that could be foreseen at the time the proposal was made. Chiang was forced by the Communists to flee his native land and a potential enemy of this country was given full power on the Chinese mainland.

These two examples of a policy devised in our State Department during the past two decades are not unique. Other instances of lesser consequence could be cited.

What General Walker's testimony does, and deserves to do, is to arouse new questions about what he terms as a hidden policy-making apparatus within the State Department. It is not a comforting thing for the American people to realize that on the basis of the record during the past two and a half decades, it does seem clear that forces are at work within this vital department hostile to what most of us conceive to be the objectives of this country. Memory of the giveaway of 600,000,000 people in China to Mao, of a fruitless slaughter of American boys in Korea, of the discovery of Alger Hiss and Walter Dexter White in places of vast power and importance; recollections of these men and events will discourage any brushing off lightly the charges of General Walker.

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